

POWER TROUBLE: GENDERED ANALYSES OF E. H. CARR'S CONCEPT OF POWER IN THE TWENTY YEARS' CRISIS

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ABSTRACT: This paper will use feminist, poststructuralist and psychoanalytic tools to analyse what Carr represses and excludes in order to construct his concept of power, and to engage with some of the symptoms this causes Carr to exhibit. It will be shown that analyses of Carr's text can be used to resist the phallogocentrism of capitalist-patriarchal and (neo)realist discourses through treating some of their more unethical symptoms.

INTRODUCTION

Judith Butler begins Gender Trouble by relating her first critical insight into power: the realisation that trouble is unavoidable and the important thing is therefore to decide what kind of trouble to cause and to get into (Butler, 1990, p. vii). This critical rethinking of 'trouble' is a good place to begin this article – I do not seek to offer an untroubled, unproblematic reading of Carr; rather, Butler's insight lets me shift my focus onto what types of trouble I can usefully cause and get into.

In this paper I seek to cause trouble for Carr by analysing and critiquing the roles that gender and power play in his text – troubling his unsustainable and unethical assumptions and exclusions. I will also seek to trouble contemporary attempts to use the complexity of Carr's realism to read his work as (proto)utopian – troubling, for example, Andrew Linklater's belief that "Carr set out the case for post-exclusionary forms of political organization" (Linklater, 1997, p. 322) – by arguing that the concept of power outlined in The Twenty Years' Crisis is dependent upon excluding the feminine and that the 'utopian' elements of Carr's thought are there largely to preserve his realism.

However, it is not clear-cut as to who is causing the trouble here – Carr's text has also troubled me, got me into trouble. Although I write about Carr's anxiety, completing this paper has made *me* anxious: attaining any sort of end to an article on a thinker as complex and ambiguous as Carr is never an easy thing, and trying to finish this paper has got me into all kinds of trouble over the course of far more drafts than I intended. I will show below that, troubling as rereading Carr may be, International Politics (IP) could benefit from the trouble these rereadings cause.

In my troubled and troubling account of Carr, I will firstly apply Cynthia Enloe's critique of the inadequacies of 'malestream' International Relations' account of power to The Twenty Years' Crisis (Enloe, 1996, p. 186): Carr's concept of power here is inadequate because, by ignoring the marginalisation of women in the International System (IS), he fails to consider the types of power needed to achieve this. Secondly, Judith Butler and Michel Foucault's work will be used to show how certain power-relations must be inscribed onto bodies *before* the power politics Carr envisages can take place. Thirdly, I shall extend Carole Pateman's critique of Hobbes' reliance on a sexual contract to Carr: before power as conceived by Carr can function, there must be a

sexual contract in which male domination is secured (Pateman, 1988, pp. 24-25). Fourthly, the aforementioned arguments will facilitate a Lacanian and Derridean discussion of what is repressed and excluded in Carr's work, the anxiety from which Carr suffers, and the self-deconstructing nature of his text and the International Political Economy (IPE). I shall conclude by considering how analyses of Carr's text can be used to trouble – to resist – the phallogocentrism of the capitalist-patriarchal IPE and (neo)realist discourses.

I am aware that the *In-Spire* journal is aimed at an interdisciplinary audience. I shall therefore offer a brief summary of The Twenty Years' Crisis – a key part of the International Relations (IR) canon – for the benefit of those readers who are not familiar with this text. The crisis referred to in the title of this book is the escalating tensions in Europe that followed the end of World War I. Rather presciently, Carr – writing before the start of World War II – offers a biting critique of the liberal 'utopianism' that was prominent at that time (and which, as we now know, was not sufficient to prevent a second world war). Carr argues for a move beyond the 'utopian' stance where "investigators...pay little attention to existing 'facts' or to the analysis of cause and effect, but...devote themselves wholeheartedly to the elaboration of visionary projects for the attainment of the ends which they have in view" (Carr, 2001, p. 6). Carr sought to move beyond this utopian stage and towards a more "critical and analytical" approach to IR (Carr, 2001, p. 9). His book was therefore one of the founding texts of political realism; however, it should be noted that Carr is not a straightforward realist – he believes that realism should be tempered with or inspired by the moral drive of 'utopian' thought (Carr, 2001, p. 4 and 84).

Carr's concept of power plays a central part of his account of IP: he argues that "politics are...in one sense always power politics." (Carr, 2001, p. 97) Carr's critique of 'utopian' IR's failure to explain the 'facts' of IP therefore springs in large part from his distaste for the 'utopian' privileging of morality over power (Carr, 2001, p. 146). This article will demonstrate that, for all Carr's focus on power and his critique of the 'utopian' failure to engage with the workings of power, Carr's own concept of power is dependent upon numerous (often gendered) exclusions and is too close to the 'customary' view of power as purely repressive (see Butler, 1997, p. 2).

ANALYSING CARR

As Derrida argues, "to write differently, we must reread differently" (Derrida, 1974, p. 87) and these rereadings should not simply reproduce (summarise, restate etc.) the content of the texts they analyse (Derrida, 1974, p. 158). I will therefore critically reread Carr using a Derridean mode of reading that pays attention to what Carr does *not* say – what is marginalised and excluded in his account (Edkins, 1996, pp. 555-556).

I shall try to let Carr 'speak' here by referencing his text closely. However, as Friedrich Nietzsche argues, "only that which has no history can be defined" (Der Derian, 2001, p. 140). This paper discusses what political struggles are necessary in order to allow Carr's concept of power to function and the article will therefore not seek a stable definition of Carr's concept of power. Rather, as Lacan observed: "[t]here is no truth that, in passing through awareness, does not lie.//But one runs after it all the same." (Lacan, 1977b, p. xxxix) In analysing Carr I will chase the 'truth' of his work while also acknowledging the impossibility of stabilising this moving, passing truth into a 'coherent' concept of power; examining where the deeply unstable 'truth' of power offered by Carr will take us and, just as importantly, where Carr refuses to go. I will therefore be conducting gendered analyses of the 'conscious' and 'unconscious' of The Twenty Years' Crisis, considering what is accepted and refused by the text (see Lacan, 1977b, p. 43).

It should be emphasised that, while these analyses of Carr's concept of power seek to critique of Carr's work in the Foucaultian sense whereby critique makes "facile gestures difficult" (Foucault, 1988, p. 155), this article is *not* a rejection or refutation of Carr's text. Although the paper will challenge the exclusions on which Carr's text depends, this is not as a demand for some 'complete' post-Carr theory of IR: it will be argued below that Carr's text, in common with IR theory in general, could not function without the use of certain exclusions. Instead, by analysing Carr's work I would hope to reveal the contingency of these exclusions and thus allow those writing after Carr to keep things moving, to move Carr's work in a more ethical direction (see Butler, 1997, p. 164; Philips, 1997). The value of the type of analysis offered in this paper is

therefore that, rather than eliminating the exclusions on which theory depends, it can allow us to challenge “where we draw these constitutive lines.” (Philips, 1997, p. 156)

THE MARGINALISATION OF WOMEN IS CARR’S “BLIND SPOT”ⁱ

For Enloe, most formal analyses of IP concentrate too much on the ‘centre’; they therefore underestimate the powers needed to sustain the relationships they try to analyse (Enloe, 1996, p. 186). Carr makes this error: through focusing on the men with a ‘central’ role in IP he ignores the power needed to marginalise most women. For example, Carr claims that “the peoples” were indifferent to the signing of secret treaties (Carr, 2001, p. 63). However, ‘the peoples’ were constructed in an exclusionary way: while (at least in theory) the elected representatives in a representative democracy represent the entire population, some of that population tends to be more represented than others. One example of this is that, when these secret treaties were signed, even most ‘democratic’ countries had not extended the franchise to include women. Women therefore would not play a full part in any agreement reached by ‘the people’.

Certain constructions of ‘the people’ can thus marginalise large parts the adult population through excluding them from direct participation in the ‘democratic’ process. Ignoring how power is used to construct ‘the people’, marginalising certain groups within ‘the people’, therefore constitutes a problematic blind spot in Carr’s work. As Enloe argues: “No individual or social group finds themselves on the ‘margins’ of any web of relationships...without some other individual or group having accumulated enough power to create the ‘centre’ somewhere else. [T]here is also the yearly and daily business of maintaining the margin where it currently is and the centre where it is now.” (Enloe, 1996, p. 186) Where ‘the people’ is constructed in such a way as to marginalise more than half of the adult population, anyone with an interest in power should ask how this exclusion was constructed and is maintained. Especially when – as with the women’s suffrage movement (Carr, 2001, p. 196) – there is public resistance to the way that certain groups are marginalised in the construction of ‘the people’, the need to ask about how power is used to maintain this construction should be obvious.

For a more complete account of power, we should listen attentively to the margins in order to accurately estimate the powers it has taken to allow the IS to persist and political representation to function within it (Enloe, 1996, p. 200). We should listen to marginalised women in order to estimate the powers used to marginalise them and, as will be argued below, to analyse the types of subjectivities constructed by these power-relations and the modes of resistance that they make possible. However, Carr uncritically refers to ‘the people’ without considering how women are excluded from it and fails to analyse the roles that these marginalised women played in IP.

As noted above, Carr was aware that there were power-struggles taking place to challenge the marginalisation of certain groups in ‘the people’ (Carr, 2001, p. 196). It is then rather strange that a political scientist for whom “politics are...in one sense always power politics” and who uses the term ‘political’ to refer to “issues involving a conflict of power” does not consider these power conflicts worthy of serious discussion in IP (Carr, 2001, p. 97). An account of power is inadequate if, as with Carr, it takes units such as ‘the people’ to be constituted prior to its discussion of power: power is clearly used to construct these units. IR theory must therefore move beyond the limits of Carr’s work to ask, as Rob Walker suggests, what the concept of the people has been and could be constructed to mean (Walker, 1993, pp. 153-154).

A defender of Carr might assert that Carr’s account of power is adequate by arguing that certain factors, such as the ‘domestic’ power that was used to deny women the vote and thus marginalise them during the construction of ‘the people’, are irrelevant to the study of IP. However, even considering just the types of power that Carr himself analyses, this defence will fail.

For Carr, “[e]conomic strength has always been an instrument of political power” (Carr, 2001, p. 105). This is uncontroversial. However Carr goes on to argue that “[t]he rise of modern nations has everywhere been marked by the emergence of a new middle class economically based on industry and trade” (Carr, 2001, p. 106), but fails to consider the vital roles that those on the “constitutive outside” of the IPE have played in this process (see Butler, 1993, pp. 37-39).

Carr’s innocent-looking phrase – “the emergence of a new middle class” – hides a multitude of complex problems. If this new class is so vital in the realm of economic power then we should

surely analyse how it emerged and the changes that this required. In line with this article's emphasis on gender, the focus here will be on the role played by gendered changes and by the marginalised women on the constitutive outside of capitalism-patriarchy in the construction of this "new middle class". It will be shown that an adequate account of power should at least let us consider how gender-relations had to be changed when moving from a pre-capitalist society to a capitalist society and when establishing a bourgeoisie: a significant change in gender-relations would have accompanied this change in modes of (re)production and the establishment of the modern bourgeois familyⁱ. However, the analysis of gender-relations on their own (insofar as such a separation of gender issues from 'normal' life is even possible) is a necessary but insufficient condition of an adequate account of power: for example, I would be sympathetic to the argument that Carr's account of how this "new middle class" emerged also excludes many issues of class, ethnicity and sexuality, which there will not be space to analyse in this brief article.

If "the reproduction of the species will be articulated as the reproduction of relations of reproduction" then students of IP should work towards an account of how power is used to reproduce these relations of reproduction (Butler, 1993, p. 167): for the bourgeoisie Carr refers to to emerge, the capitalist IPE must be supplied with workers. Also, in order for Carr's "new middle class" to be produced, its members must be reproduced: although Hobbes may have influenced Carr, following Hobbes' recommendation that we think of persons as springing up from the ground like mushrooms will not allow an adequate account of how this "new middle class" emerged (Carr, 2001, p. 63; Hobbes, 1998, Chapter VIII Article 1).

Carr himself raises the question of how subjects can be made to internalise power (Carr, 2001, p. 125). We should continue this line of questioning to ask Carr how sexed and gendered bodies are constructed through subjection to and internalisation of power, in a way that allows "the emergence of a new middle class" which is needed for the capitalism-patriarchy of the IPE to function and makes the assumptions of Carr's text appear feasibleⁱⁱⁱ. A Foucaultian analysis of the mark's use in creating and disciplining the feminine subject will indicate a direction for this account.

Foucault begins Discipline and Punish by discussing marks that took place in a public execution (Foucault, 1997, pp. 3-6). Although we now have more modern ways of disciplining subjects, similar marks are still used in order to enable capitalism-patriarchy to function. A modern example of the mark's use would be the mass rape that took place in the war in the former Yugoslavia (see MacKinnon, 1993). Women's bodies were marked by a loss of virginity, by gynaecological damage, and by being made pregnant by their rapists (Cockburn, 1998, pp. 184-185).

As Cynthia Cockburn notes, in this war rape was seen as a way to murder the woman's sense of self as she lived before the rape (Cockburn, 1998, p. 223). However, as was demonstrated by the way that women continued to (re)create themselves and their selves after their ordeals, rape was also productive of a particular type of feminine subject^{iv}. This marking of bodies also marked subjects as feminine: they were marked as passive, as 'victims' of rape, and as subjects of masculine power; however, as will be argued below, the creation of a certain type of feminine subject through 'her' subjection to power-relations also allows these subjects to resist the very power-relations through which they are constructed (Butler 1997, p. 3). 'Abstract' theories such as Carr's depend upon the inscription of power-relations onto very real bodies, often in the most brutal way, in order to make them feasible (see Mendel, 2003)^v.

A great deal of force has clearly been used to construct modern gender-relations. The "emergence of a new middle class" that Carr refers to would have required the use of a massive amount of (political) force in order to construct a certain type of feminine subject. A similar use of force would also be needed to construct numerous other subjectivities that are essential to the capitalist system; for example, capitalism needed to construct and discipline the subjectivity of the workers servicing its factories in a particular way (Foucault, 1997, pp. 149-151).

The brevity of this article precludes an analysis of all ways in which capitalism-patriarchy has worked to construct the types of subjectivity that it depends upon – this would be a massive task. However, what should be noted is that Carr passes over all of the violence in a seven-word phrase when he writes about "the emergence of a new middle class". Carr sympathetically discusses the belief that "the state should seek actively to promote the acquisition of wealth" (Carr, 2001, p. 106) but fails to consider how power has been and continues to be used in many

ways, including the reworking of gender-relations, in order to make this capitalist/mercantilist mode of acquisition possible. What Carr *does not* say about power therefore ensures that what he *does* say about it is inadequate.

THE SEXUAL CONTRACT IN HOBBS AND CARR

I demonstrate above that Carr assumes women to be marginalised in the IPE but fails to analyse how power has been used to marginalise them. My arguments resemble Pateman's reading of contract theorists such as Hobbes: she shows that these theorists also assume the subordination of women in society (Pateman, 1988, pp. 48-49). For Pateman, the type of power politics envisioned by Hobbes relies upon a repressed sexual contract that is prior to his social contract and necessary for it to function (Pateman, 1988, pp. 48-49). This essay will give a brief outline of Pateman's interpretation of Hobbes, before offering a similar reading of Carr.

Pateman observes that, for Hobbes, there is no natural basis for men's dominion over women (Pateman, 1988, p. 41). However, this leaves Hobbes with a problem: free, equal and rational women would not consent to a Hobbesian social contract that subordinates women to men (Pateman, 1988, pp. 48-49). Hobbes could avoid this problem through defending an account of sexual difference. However, this option is not open to Hobbes because, in order for Hobbes' account of power-relations in the 'state of war' to function, differences between individuals must be effaced in order to argue that all individuals have relatively similar strengths – it is because there are *insufficient* differences between Hobbesian individuals that they seek to challenge one another and thus enter the 'state of war' (Foucault, 2003, p. 90). Hobbes therefore relies upon a (repressed) sexual contract that is prior to his social contract, in which all women are subordinated to men before the social contract is signed (Pateman, 1988, pp. 48-49). Carr acknowledges Hobbes' influence on his work (Carr, 2001, p. 63). This may explain why Carr's account of power suffers from problems analogous to those that Pateman finds in Hobbes' story of the social contract.

As shown above, an adequate account of "the emergence of a new middle class" (Carr, 2001, p. 106) should also explain how power is used to reconfigure social relations (including gender-relations) and create this new class. Carr fails to do this. However he *does* assume that economic power, and specifically the types of economic power associated with capitalist-patriarchal modes of (re)production, can be used in IP (Carr, 2001, p. 105). Just as Hobbes fails to account for why free and equal women would consent to a patriarchal social contract, Carr fails to account for why free women would enter into a capitalist-patriarchal IPE. Like Hobbes, Carr does not openly defend an account of 'natural' sexual difference but instead assumes (but does not openly acknowledge) that sexual contracts have been enacted prior to his discussion of the IPE, ensuring that men dominate it. Free and equal women would not consent to capitalism-patriarchy, and sexual contracts must therefore be used to coerce them to participate in the modern IPE.

Pateman demands that political theorists analyse the role of the sexual contract in maintaining their social contracts (Pateman, 1988, p. 1). For Hobbes this might require a fuller account of how women are forced into an oppressive sexual contract, which would lead to a questioning – but not necessarily an outright rejection – of many of his conclusions (Pateman, 1988, pp. 48-50). With Carr we must consider what type of sexual contracts are a precondition of the capitalist-patriarchal mode of (re)production and inter-state relations that he discusses, how these contracts are used to construct gender-relations where women are placed in subordinate positions, the type of sexed and gendered subjects constructed by these contracts, and the modes of resistance made possible by these types of subjectivity.

The sexual contracts that the IPE depends upon, and that Carr's text relies on in order to appear feasible, require a means of enforcement. Elizabeth Grosz suggests that contracts are "ultimately founded on...bodily collateral" (Grosz, 1993, p. 65). In the case of women, who own less than one-hundredth of the world's property (Pettman, 1996, p. 171), there would be an especially strong need to use bodily collateral to enforce sexual contracts: as Nietzsche argues, those who cannot use property to repay the debts contracted to them will repay these debts with their bodies (Nietzsche, 1996, Second Essay, Section 4).

In order for sexual contracts to bind women, these contracts must be grounded in bodily collateral. I argue above that gendered subjects are constructed through inscribing certain power-relations onto bodies. A substantial part of this process of gendering subjects would then be the inscription of sexual contracts onto bodies – bodily collateral is gendered when disciplined through having a sexual contract inscribed onto it. The construction of the feminine subject through its subjection to power-relations such as those described above would therefore also constitute the subjection of this subject to a sexual contract – a subject becomes feminine when it internalises a sexual contract. It will be argued below that this construction of feminine subjects through their subjection to capitalist-patriarchal sexual contracts is also self-deconstructing, as it allows resistance to capitalism-patriarchy to take place.

CARR RETAINS A 'CUSTOMARY' CONCEPT OF POWER

As shown above, Carr does not give an adequate account of the construction of (feminine) subjects and does not reflect on the role that sexual contracts play in his thought. This is due in large part to his rather crude concept of power. As Butler argues, and as the above discussion of the vital role that the subjection to power plays in the formation of subjectivity suggests, power should be conceptualised as something productive that we depend on for our existence and that we internalise: our subjectivity is constructed through our subjection to power-relations (Butler, 1997, pp. 1-2). However, Carr's concept of power is closer to what Butler defines as the 'customary' view of power – something that simply imposes itself on us rather than something we depend upon for our existence (Butler, 1997, p. 2; Carr, 2001, p. 97 and 125). Therefore, Carr cannot give an adequate account of how subjects are constructed and gendered through their subjection to power and sexual contracts, and how (as will be demonstrated below) these subjects are then able to resist capitalism-patriarchy.

However, Carr's 'customary' view of power is also self-deconstructing – he acknowledges that it must be possible for power to be internalised for there to be a politics of international opinion (Carr, 2001, p. 125). Carr's view of power is thus destabilised, which may be why the first chapter of *The Twenty Years' Crisis* is so torn between purpose and analysis: Carr is struggling to reconcile his 'customary' view of power with more radical, almost poststructuralist concepts^{vi}. He thus remains torn between the positivist model of the social scientist as an independent observer of the 'facts' and a more critical, Marxian model of the social scientist as driven to change said 'facts' and deeply implicated in their social and ethical realities.

Carr 'resolves' this dilemma by repressing the more critical concepts of power within his work and privileging the 'customary' view of power, the broadly positivist philosophy of social science and the realist paradigm of IR. Carr's scathing attacks on the 'utopian' privileging of normative concerns should therefore be seen as a symptom of this repression – Carr denies his own 'utopianism' and, to echo Shakespeare, Carr doth protest too much (Shakespeare).

A LACK IS CONSTITUTIVE OF CARR AS A SUBJECT AND AUTHOR

It would be easy to read Carr's repressed critical considerations of power and his 'utopian' concerns as signs that he is not wholly committed to realism (see for example Linklater, 1997, p. 322). However, the reverse is actually the case – Carr's apparent concessions to 'utopianism' should be viewed as a means to preserve his realism. These 'concessions' are structurally similar to guilt – Carr's desire for and love of realism is central, and his 'concessions' to 'utopianism' show this love working to preserve its object from "one's own potentially obliterating violence" (Butler, 1997, p. 25). This 'utopian' lack in Carr's work is thus there to preserve the brutally amoral theorising of power politics in which he takes such pleasure from the ultimate failure of such politics to "provide us with the springs of action which are necessary even to the pursuit of thought" (Carr, 2001, p. 84).

To persist as an author, Carr must relate to the Other through the 'symbolic law'. For Lacan, subjects need a lack in order to do this (Shepherdson, 2001, pp. xxxii-xxxiii). On being socialised into an intersymbolic system, we necessarily lose a certain *jouissance* that we experienced as children (Lacan, 1977a, pp. 5-6; Lacan, 1977b, p. 184)^{vii}. If this *jouissance* – which exists in the unsymbolisable real as opposed to symbolic reality (Lacan, 1977b, pp. 53-54) – were symbolised,

the socialised subject would dissolve and the subject would become unable to function within the 'symbolic law' (Butler, 1993, p. 204). Although we are driven to seek *jouissance*, its lack is necessary for the subject to survive: the subject could not persist were it to be given the *jouissance* it desires because, if the signifiers of the real were to re-enter symbolic reality, the subject would unravel itself and all signification (Butler, 1993, p. 204)^{viii}. The critical considerations in Carr's work should therefore be seen as necessary for him to keep his distance from the *jouissance* of a completed realism and thus necessary to allow his realism to function.

In an unpublished seminar on 'anxiety', Lacan argues that anxiety is not a lack as such but the lack of a lack: the subject suffers anxiety when threatened with dissolution through losing its constitutive lack of *jouissance*, through coming too close to the *jouissance* of the Other (Shepherdson, 2001, p. xxxii). Although Carr may fantasise about realising the *jouissance* that could come from a horrifically complete realism, his text uses 'concessions' to 'utopianism' to keep this *jouissance* at a distance.

Carr becomes anxious when the brilliance of his work threatens him with realising the fantasy of a complete realism and therefore losing the lack that is necessary for any subject to exist (Shepherdson, 2001, p. xxxii). Carr's text threatens to reveal the "indifferent and arbitrary character" of his realist object – to reveal what Slavoj Žižek calls the "obscene object of postmodernity" (Žižek, 1999a, p. 41) – through fulfilling the twentieth-century desire to deliver the real thing-in-itself: the terrifying being and becoming of IP (Žižek, 2002, p. 5). Carr's anxiety is triggered when his text brings him too close to the object *a*, to the big Other from which the subject has separated itself in order to constitute itself (Lacan, 1977b, p. 103; Sheridan, 1977, p. 282). This anxiety means that Carr continually frustrates his own realist desires. His text is thus a kind of anxious 'acting out' where, as Roberto Harari argues, the subject tries to make a desirable object (for Carr, realism) present while also trying to keep distance between the subject and the object *a* (the obscene object of postmodernity that a 'pure' realism would deliver) (Harari, 2001, p. 79).

Therefore, although Carr desires the *jouissance* of a 'pure' realism, he must thwart this desire in order to maintain the lack that is constitutive of his existence as a subject and an author (Butler, 1997, p. 9): his desire to become a 'purer' realist must be thwarted by 'concessions' to 'utopianism' in order to allow Carr and the realism he loves to survive at all. The repressed 'utopianism' in Carr and the repressed Marxian concerns are therefore entirely necessary for what is generally read as the main thrust of his theory – his realism – to survive.

In Lacanian thought, femininity is associated with lack (Žižek, 1999b, p. 134). This association of femininity with lack is also maintained within many of the discourses of IR: for example, Carol Cohn has found that defence intellectuals often associate a lack of 'rational perspective' on warfare and mass-killing – as is thought to be evidenced by a serious concern for the welfare of the millions of humans who could be slaughtered in a nuclear war – with femininity, with acting like a woman (Cohn, 1993, p. 227). Similarly, while Carr sees realism as overflowing with plenty – coming close to an excessive *jouissance* – he constructs 'utopianism' as lacking the rationality and practicality of realism (Carr, 2001, pp. 6-9). While Carr does not explicitly describe utopianism as feminine, he does desire its lack; the way he relates to utopianism is therefore analogous to Butler's concept of heterosexual masculinity.

In relating to the lacking or 'feminine' other of utopianism, the way that Carr positions himself is analogous to the ambiguity of heterosexual masculinity which is defined by repudiation of 'the feminine' and, at the same time, a desire for it – a man "wouldn't be caught dead being [a woman]: therefore he wants her." (Butler, 1997, p. 137) Analogously, Carr insists that he is not a 'utopian', that none of us should be 'utopians', but at the same time he desperately desires to retain some of 'her' utopian lack in order to reduce his anxiety (see Carr, 2001, p. 10; Irigaray, 1985, p. 228).

As shown above, Carr's existence as an author would dissolve if he attained the complete realism that he desires. His text therefore constructs realism in opposition to and dependent upon the lack of the other of 'utopianism'. If realism were totalised then its discourses would no longer be able to function: they would lack a lack, lack a constitutive absence. Realism must thus rely upon 'utopianism', or some other approach to IR, providing the lack that its existence depends upon^{ix}. It is therefore likely that, in realist discourses, theorists will become anxious

when threatened with the lack of a lack which could follow the completion or totalisation of realism – this would lead to its dissolution.

In the unlikely event that readers have been left with the impression that I come close to a 'perfect' or 'complete' reading of Carr in this article, it should be emphasised that the IR theory used in this paper is, like realist IR theory, dependent upon retaining a constitutive lack or a constitutive margin. This article has, after all, only been possible because I have been able to use Carr's text as an other to analyse, challenge and resist. Rather than seeking to enclose the constitutive outside of IR within a 'complete' IR theory – a theory which would collapse through coming too close to the desirable *jouissance* of a complete IR theory – this paper would advocate a move towards a more self-reflexive type of theorising which interrogates its own exclusions (see Butler and Scott, 1992, p. xiv). It should thus be emphasised that there are many interesting and important ways of looking at Carr and at IR that are excluded from this article; by acknowledging that this text cannot avoid certain exclusions I would hope to encourage attempts to keep this article moving by interrogating what is excluded from this paper, in order move towards a better IR theory (see Butler, 1997, pp. 164-165).

REREADING CARR AND SEXUAL CONTRACTS

It should now be clear that Carr's text depends upon a lack, which is often constructed as feminine, and that the internalisation of sexual contracts is important in constructing 'the feminine' and therefore in constructing this lack. These sexual contracts are clearly a kind of text, at least in the Derridean sense where "[t]here is nothing outside of the text" (Derrida, 1974, p. 158. Emphasis in original). In these texts, so central to the workings of power in the IPE and to the feasibility of The Twenty Years' Crisis, there is always-already written the potential for resistance.

In creating feminine subjects – in forcing women into a subordinate position within capitalism-patriarchy – sexual contracts also create the potential for resistance: power will suffer a "turning-back" (Butler, 1997, p. 3). The massive exercise of force that is needed to maintain current gender-relations – ranging from widespread domestic violence to the use of rape as a weapon of war – should *in itself* lead to the conclusion that, if so much force has to be used, there is tremendous resistance taking place and tremendous potential for resistance: resistance is always internal to the workings of power (Foucault, 1990, p. 95).

As noted above, Derrida argues that before we can write differently we must learn to reread differently (Derrida, 1974, p. 87). Rereading sexual contracts is a necessary precursor to the acts of resistance that could allow a different writing, that could allow us to challenge the sexual contracts used by Carr and by capitalism-patriarchy through writing other contractual or non-contractual relations.

Jürgen Habermas reads Derrida's focus on the textual as a claim that the world is a book written in the handwriting of God (Habermas, 1987, p. 164). Habermas believes that all optimism is removed from this picture as only traces of this book in God's handwriting ever existed, and even these traces are now lost (Habermas, 1987, p. 164). However Derrida's optimism (and mine as well) is possible *because* God's name and writing are entirely absent.

After the death of God, there can be no absolute guarantee for any idea (Haar, 1997, p. 14). The metawriting that would be needed to guarantee the meaning of any writing died with God: we postmoderns are, as Lyotard observes, incredulous towards metanarratives and therefore also incredulous towards any metawriting (Lyotard, 1984, p. xxiv). It is because all trace of God's writing is lost that rereading sexual contracts is possible. Sexual contracts, including those Carr relies upon, can no longer be guaranteed – even the bodily collateral on which they are secured is also a site of resistance. The body "is simultaneously the text upon which the script of society is written and the fugitive source from which spring desires, resistances, and thought exceeding that script" (Connolly, 1995, p. 13). For example, the anarcho-feminist Emma Goldman worked as a prostitute, selling the collateral on which the sexual contract is secured in order to fund her challenges to capitalism-patriarchy (Shulman, 1979, p. 25).

Deconstruction takes place every time a sexual contract is enacted in the IPE and is inscribed onto a body. As argued above, for capitalism-patriarchy to function sexual contracts must be inscribed onto bodies to construct feminine subjects and capitalism-patriarchy depends upon excluding the feminine to its constitutive outside. This excluded feminine is necessary to and

constitutive of, yet unthematizable by, capitalism-patriarchy and is therefore an excluded Other that deconstructs the discourses of capitalism-patriarchy from their constitutive outside (Butler, 1993, p. 39).

An unthematizable feminine Other is necessarily parasitic in the discourses of capitalism-patriarchy (see Derrida, 1988, p. 48) – including Carr's work. The feminine Other that deconstructs and offers resistance to capitalist-patriarchal discourses is also essential to the function of their signification; in the *construction* of capitalism-patriarchy there must therefore also be the *deconstruction* of its own phallogocentrism (Derrida, 1988, p. 48). Unfortunately, Carr's 'customary' concept of power is too crude to allow a full consideration of power's doubling-back. This means that he cannot offer an adequate account of how deconstruction takes place when sexual contracts, essential to the IPE, are enacted.

Carr's text, like the sexual contracts on which it is premised and the capitalist-patriarchal IPE it describes, is also self-deconstructing: parasitic within it are concepts of power and 'the feminine' on which it depends for its *construction* but which also lead to its *deconstruction* (Derrida, 1988, p. 48). For all his discussion of change (see Carr, 2001, pp. 199-202), Carr fails to account for how the deconstruction of gender-relations takes place – in both the IPE and his own work.

CONCLUSIONS

Carr's concept of power can, through gendered analyses, be seen to fail on several levels. Firstly, Carr remains blind to the way that power is used to marginalise women in the IS. Secondly, his concept of power assumes the use of oppressive sexual contracts to maintain the gender-relations that his text needs to function. Thirdly, Carr represses any critical account of power and is therefore unable to give an adequate account of how gendered subjects are formed by internalising power-relations and sexual contracts. Carr's moves towards political realism thus leave him open to the anxiety caused by the lack of a lack.

Most unfortunate in Carr's account of power is his failure to consider how the enactment of certain sexual contracts and gender-relations on which he relies also involves a resistance to and deconstruction of these contracts and relationships. The blind spots in Carr's concept of power therefore mean that his account of the potentials for resistance in, and thus potentials for reform of, IP is inadequate. This article has sought to highlight this, and thus suggest ways in which we could move beyond some of Carr's limitations.

Harari argues that, when faced with an anxious analysand, the analyst can either 'let them fall' – abandoning the possibility of success and letting the analysand fall into a complete identification with the *a* that would lead to their dissolution – or work on their symptom with an interpretation proceeding from the Other (Harari, 2001, pp. 83-85). Those trying to conduct critical analyses of Carr are also faced with the choice of whether to 'let him fall' into the hands of those (neo)realist followers who would move him a suicidally complete relation with the object *a*, with the 'obscene object of postmodernity', or to seek a (re)interpretation of Carr that proceeds from his Other.

Harari illustrates his point with the case of one of Freud's analysands who threw herself off a railway platform and onto the train tracks, letting herself fall "in an almost total identification with the *a*." (Harari, 2001, pp. 83-84. Emphasis in original) This example should remind us of the ambiguous sense in which 'let fall' is used – this woman did not only fall, but also jumped. In a similar way, one can see in Carr's text his desire for the *jouissance* that could only come from jumping off the relatively stable platform of the intersymbolic system, jumping towards a complete realism. However, such realism would – as shown above – lead to the dissolution of Carr's name and text through his falling into a near-complete identification with the *a*. It is then anxiety that holds Carr back from taking this fatal leap and also anxiety which means that there is something left in Carr's text which is amenable to analysis.

The psychoanalyses of Carr's text that his anxiety makes possible are, as Lacan acknowledges, not moral in themselves (Lacan, 1992, p. 22). However, these analyses can be used to prepare the way for explicitly moral readings using other theoretical frameworks such as feminism (Lacan, 1992, p. 22). As shown above, an analysis of Carr that begins from the (non-Lacanian) Other of the feminine can let us engage with his more pathological symptoms in an ethical way, let our analyses move Carr's thought towards a more positive relationship with many

others. This paper's argument that power is inescapable – that the subjection to power is essential for the formation of subjectivity – could thus allow us to move towards a more effective ethical critique Carr and IP: by acknowledging the role that power plays in our subjectivity we could offer more effective resistance to the power-relations that constitute capitalism-patriarchy.

Carr's anxiety can be extremely useful in establishing such an ethical response to his work: from a Lacanian perspective "anxiety...does not deceive" (Lacan, 1977b, p. 41) and, rather than psychoanalysis trying to eliminate anxiety, this anxiety "should be administered in small doses, and...can be put to work in the unbinding of the symptom" (Lacan, 1977b, p. xxiii). In the course of critiquing Carr such analyses can, as argued above, be used to move Carr's thought away from certain fallacious postures by making his "facile gestures difficult" (Foucault, 1988, p. 155). As noted above, the analyses conducted in this article do not offer any 'complete' reading of Carr; I would therefore encourage readers to interrogate and critique the exclusions that are constitutive of this paper, unbinding certain of its symptoms, and thus also keep this article moving towards a better account of Carr and IR.

As noted in the introduction, Carr's text can cause a great deal of trouble for those trying to analyse him. Though the least troubling option for the analyst would be to 'let Carr fall', ending the analysis, Carr is too valuable to lose in this way. Gendered analyses of Carr's text can – as suggested above – be a useful way to resist capitalism-patriarchy, insofar as this system is viewed as a pathological symptom of the repression and marginalisation of the feminine Other in IP (and in Carr's text). Analysing Carr, troubling as this may be for the analysts, can suggest ways of making trouble for – of resisting – the phallogocentrism of capitalism-patriarchy and (neo)realist discourses.

ENDNOTES

ⁱ I borrow this term from the title of Luce Irigaray's deconstructive reading of Freud (Irigaray, 1985, pp. 11-129). It is unclear, as so much is unclear with Irigaray, precisely what 'blind spot' she refers to. However it would seem that, as I will argue below is the case with Carr, at least part of Freud's blindness is his acceptance of certain aspects the construction of sex in a patriarchal (and, for Irigaray, phallogocentric) society as natural and immutable (Irigaray, 1985, pp. 112-113).

ⁱⁱ I take this insight from the tradition of socialist/Marxist feminists writing after Friedrich Engels (for example Engels, 1986, pp. 58-115; Tong, 1998, p. 103).

ⁱⁱⁱ I would follow Butler in arguing that the construction of gender is intimately linked to the construction of sex, though sex may be (discursively) constructed as 'natural' and prediscursive (Butler, 1990, p. 7).

^{iv} In order to avoid confusion, I should explicitly note that this is not intended to imply that rape is in any sense a good thing. The power-relations that form subjects need not be ethical. The subjection to power through which subjects are constituted is often horrendously painful – as Butler argues, "[t]o be dominated by a power external to oneself is a familiar and agonizing form power takes" (Butler, 1997, p. 1).

^v As Slavoj Žižek argues, in the workings of the IPE "abstraction is inscribed into very 'real' situations" (Žižek, 2002, p. 36).

^{vi} Regarding the very radical nature of some of Carr's statements on power, note for example how similar Carr's claim, also quoted above, that "politics are...in one sense always power politics" and his use of the term 'political' to refer to "issues involving a conflict of power" (Carr, 2001, p. 122) are to the Nietzschean/poststructuralist philosopher Keith Ansell-Pearson's argument that questions of politics are necessarily questions of power (Ansell-Pearson, 1993, p. 36).

^{vii} '*Jouissance*' can be roughly translated as 'enjoyment', but to do so would lose the sexual connotations of the term (Sheridan, 1977, p. 281). I will therefore follow Sheridan's practice and leave '*jouissance*' in French in this paper.

^{viii} This rather poststructuralist reading of Lacan is of course also a violent reading – the real is re-presented here in a way that Lacan would have disputed. However, one could argue that the violence of this reading's focus on the textual is nonetheless *in the spirit of* Lacan's project to emphasise the importance of language in psychoanalytic thought (Lacan, 1977b, p. 18 and 20).

^{ix} Now that neoliberalism and neo-realism have become so theoretically close to one another, both of these 'mainstream' approaches to IR increasingly constitute 'critical' readers of the discipline as the other or the absence on which 'mainstream' discourses depend – note for example how often poststructuralism or feminism is argued not to be part of 'proper' IR, relegated to its constitutive outside. 'Mainstream' IR theory is then constituted by a rejection of 'critical' concerns. Just as, for Butler, normative heterosexuality is often constituted by a rejection of the abject figures of the "feminised 'fag' and the phallicized 'dyke'" (Butler, 1993, p. 103), 'mainstream' IR theory is often constituted through the representation of those arguing for 'critical' perspectives on IR as abject figures (nihilists, for example) who cannot even produce a 'coherent' research programme.

Keohane's ('mainstream' neoliberal) attempts to engage with feminism offer an especially clear example of this move. Keohane responds to Cynthia Weber's poststructuralist feminist critique of his efforts (Weber, 1994) by claiming that her article "did not constitute a *serious attempt to discuss real issues*" (Keohane, 1989, p. 193. Emphasis added). Through this dismissal of their concerns, figures of abjection such as poststructuralist feminists become "inarticulate yet organising figures within the...symbolic" (Butler, 1993, p. 103): although figures such as Weber may be used to organise the

paradigm in which 'mainstream' IR theorists write, this paradigm does not allow 'critical' theorists to fully articulate their concerns within it (Tickner, 1997).

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